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STATEMENT OF THIS CASE 
In January 2001, Appellant and his wife (Jolene), purchased Lot 74 
in the Island Woods subdivision from Dennis Baker, a longtime real estate 
developer in the Eagle, ID area. Island Woods is located between the north and 
south channels of the Boise river just east of Eagle Road. At the time of purchase, 
both Appellant and Jolene were full time residents of and domiciled in Billings, 
Montana. Consistent with the statutory form of title options available to Montana 
residents, title to Lot 74 was taken as undivided, unequal tenants-in-common 
(TIC), and not as joint tenants. Record, Page 214, Corporate Warranty Deed. 
Montana does not recognize a tenancy by entirety or community property. 
In 2004-05, a single family residence was constructed on Lot 74 using funds 
from the separate estates of the parties and financing provided by Montana based 
mortgage lender, Sterling Development & Mortgage, Inc. (Sterling). To support 
construction financing, Appellant mortgaged only his interest to Sterling. 
Record, Pages 28-30, 106-107, Real Estate Mortgage & Promissory Note. 
Jolene's individual TIC interest was left unencumbered. The constructed 
residence became Appellant and Jolene's principal residence and homestead 
in late October 2005. 
In the fall of 2006, Appellant and the Island Woods Homeowners 
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Association (IWHOA) disagreed over the meaning and enforcement of a 
landscaping provision in the HOA's Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
(CC&Rs). A lawsuit was filed on November 3, 2006 by Island Woods against 
Appellant. Neither Jolene, Sterling or Lot 74 were named in this litigation. 
Over its course, the 2006 litigation resulted in a series of judgments for attorney 
fees and costs against Appellant only. 
On April 1, 2011, the instant action was filed as a two (2) count complaint 
against Appellant, Jolene and Sterling. Count One sought to void the 
construction indebtedness and mortgage between Appellant and Sterling based 
upon LC. Section 55-901 and an alleged fraudulent transfer. Record, Pages 
21-22, Complaint. Count Two sought a declaratory judgment against Jolene 
and Sterling as to Appellant's three judgments from the 2006 litigation. 
Record, Pages 22-23, Complaint. 
Appellant answered the complaint on May 6, 2011. Record, Pages 117-136, 
Answer. Jolene and Sterling did not. Default judgments were entered against 
Jolene and Sterling on June 6, 2011. Record, Page 3, ROA. Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment was filed on June 13, 2011. Plaintiffs counsel filed an 
amended memorandum in support of its summary judgment motion on July 8, 
2011, but failed to address by argument, citation or authority, Appellant's three 
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standing counterclaims set out in the Answer. Record, Pages 166-188. In an 
attempt to rectify this oversight, a truly unorthodox "Clarification" pleading 
was filed on July 14, 2011. Once again, no argument, citation or authority was 
presented to the District Court to support the positions taken. Record, Pages 
189-191, Plaintiffs Clarification ... 
On September 29, 2011, after hearing, the District Court orally 
granted summary judgment against Appellant and entered a single paragraph 
Final Judgment in favor of IWHOA. No findings of fact, conclusions oflaw or 
memorandum decision supporting or discussing summary judgment were ever 
placed of record. 
On October 13, 2011, Appellant filed a Rule 59(e), I.R.C.P., motion to 
vacate the September 29, 2011 Final Judgment on grounds of transparent 
judicial front running as evidenced by the Clerk's 4:- p.m. time stamp. 
Record, Pages 238-239, 243-249. 
On December 1, 2011, Plaintiffs counsel admitted for the first time 
that as required by Rule 54, I.R.C.P ., the attorney fee component of its then 
pending fee and cost request had not been "actually paid" by the putative 
Plaintiff/client. The admission also ran to four (4) fee and cost requests from 
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the previous 2006 litigation. Record; Page 275, Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum. 
Plaintiffs counsel filed an opposition to Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion 
on December 9, 2011, but, as the District Court observed, failed to adequately 
address the merits of the motion. Record, Page 287, Lines 6-11. The District 
Court sua sponte proceeded to remedy Plaintiff counsel's advocacy shortcomings 
on December 22, 2011 by authoring a fourteen (14) page "Notice of Intent to Rule 
on Different Grounds on Rule 59(e) Motion." Record, Pages 286-301. 
Consistent with the District Court's declared "Intent," an Order was entered on 
January 9, 2012 denying the Rule 59(e) Motion and granting, without change or 
modification, Plaintiff its requested attorney fees and costs. 
A Supplemental Judgment for attorney fees and costs was entered 
against this Appellant only in the amount of $21, 306.40 on January 12, 
2012. An Amended Writ of Execution against the entirety of Lot 74 followed. 
Appellant pursuant to Rule 62, I.R.C.P., moved the District Court on 
Monday, February 6, 2012 for an order to stay, while on appeal, all proceedings 
to enforce any of the Plaintiffs judgment(s) against Lot 74, Appellant's 
homestead. Record, Pages 337-339, 341-348. 
The grounds for this Rule 62 Motion were two-fold: 
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1) Plaintiff failure to comply with the statutory provisions governing 
homesteads and their sale under an execution as set forth in LC. Title 55, 
Chapters 10 and 11. More particularly, I. C. Sections 55-1101, et seq. which 
specifically apply to an execution sale of a homestead had not been followed. 
2) The January 27, 2012 Amended Writ of Execution, page 3, listed two 
judgments that did not constitute final judgments in accordance with Rule 58, 
I.R.C.P., or this Court's case law precedent. Specifically, the June 3, 2010 
judgment and the January 12, 2012judgment were deficient in both form and 
substance. 
Appellant filed a second companion Rule 62, I.R.C.P., motion with the 
District Court on Monday, February 13, 2012 asking for an order to quash the 
Plaintiffs January 27, 2012 Amended Writ of Execution (Amended Writ) 
and the January 31, 2012 Levy (Levy). Record, Pages 349-351, 364-371. 
The basis for this second Rule 62 Motion was that the Amended Writ and Levy 
were mathematically and financially incorrect and lacked the required 
substantive and procedural due process elements needed for a valid execution 
sale of a tenant-in-common owned homestead where one tenant was a judgment 
debtor and the other not. 
A hearing was held on Thursday afternoon, March 15, 2012 at 2:30 pm 
on Appellant's two Rule 62 Motions. After receiving a brief argument from both 
parties, Judge Copsey, without explanation or discussion, denied both Rule 62 
Motions. The Lot 74 homestead was subsequently sold at Sheriffs sale on 
Tuesday, March 27, 2012. 
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On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a second attorney fee and cost 
memorandum for the period October 4, 2011 to March 27, 2012. The 
memorandum asked for fees evidenced by time entries of $17, 903.06, 
discretionary costs of $506.06 and future anticipated attorneys fees of 
$20,750.00. Timely Rule 54(d)(6) and (e)(6), I.R.C.P., motions in objection 
and a requested hearing were filed on April 13, 2012. Record, Pages 386-388. 
The grounds for both motions were: 
1. The attorney fees requested were in material part unearned, excessive 
and unethical, and 
2. The attorney fee and cost request did not substantially comply with the 
pleading and practice requirements of Rule 54, I.R.C.P., Rule 35(a)(6), I.A.R., 
or this Court's precedent. 
As allowed by Rule 7(b)(3)(C), I.R.C.P., a brief in support of the Rule 
54(d)(6) and (e)(6) motions was filed on April 26, 2012. Record, Pages 402-411. 
Plaintiff did not file (and has not filed to date) a responsive or opposition brief to 
the fee and cost objections. This advocacy shortcoming was, however, short lived 
and most generously rewarded. On May 24, 2012, the District Court without 
hearing or further briefing entered a ten (10) page memorandum decision and 
order granting Plaintiffs counsel its catalogued fees and costs, as well as the 
estimated future fees requested. 




Appellant presents the following issues for this Court's review: 
1) Under LC. Section 55-908, on the Complaint's Count One (the 
fraudulent transfer claim), did the District Court err by granting summary 
judgment against the sole answering defendant based, wholly or in part, 
upon the default of the corporate co-defendant? 
2) Under Rule 54, LR.C.P., did the District Court err by awarding 
Plaintiffs counsel unpaid or unearned attorney fees and costs? 
3) Did the District Court err under LC. Section 11-102 by allowing the 
sheriffs sale to go forward based upon a demonstrated mathematically and 
financially defective writ of execution? 
4) Under Rule 56, LR.C.P., did the District Court err by orally dismissing 
the sole answering Defendant's three counterclaims without requiring any proof 
or evidence of the Plaintiffs affirmative defenses of issue and claims preclusion? 
5) Under Rules 15, 54(c) and 56, LR.C.P., did the. District Court err by 
allowing the Plaintiff, sans motion or order, to add a claim for a fourth judgment 
post-default to the Complaint's Count Two--the declaratory judgment action? 
6) Under Rule 56, LR.C.P., based upon the evidence and exhibits, did the 
District Court err by constructively reclassifying the ownership interests of the 
two individual Defendants' homestead from tenant-in-common separate property 
interests to a community property interest? 
7) Did the District Court err by allowing the sheriffs sale to go forward 
without requiring the Plaintiff to comply with the execution process governing 
homesteads as set forth in I.C. Section 55-1101, et. seq.? 
8) Can a valid execution sale be conducted against a homestead owned 
by a husband Gudgment debtor) and wife (non-judgment debtor) as undivided 
tenants-in-common without a pre-sale appraisal and a pre-sale determination 
of the tenants' respective interests? 




Legal arguments lashed to the same mast by a common theme tend to be 
a more interesting read and are generally more persuasive. In this case, despite 
their wide ranging topics, nearly all of the issues on appeal share a surprising 
common denominator: I.A.R. 35(a)(6). Throughout this brief, Rule 35(a)(6)'s 
methodology and case precedent will be used to illustrate the striking contrast 
between the workings of this Court and the District Court below. 
On March 22, 2012, in the case of Stevenson u. Windermere Real 
Estate/Capital Group, Inc. et. al., 2012 Opinion No. 55, Docket No. 38121, 
Justice Horton wrote: 
"A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on 
summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal." O'Guin v. 
Bingham Cnty., 139 Idaho 9, 15, 72 P.3rd 849, 855 (2003) (citing Beco Const. Co. v. 
City ofldaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950,956 (1993))." 
One day later (March 23, 2012), in the case of Vermont Trotter v. Bank of 
New York Mellon, et. al., 2012 Opinion No. 57, Docket No. 38022, Justice Horton 
wrote: 
"The Idaho Appellate Rules require an appellant to support its contentions "with citations 
to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied upon." I.A.R. 
35(a)(6). Thus, it is "well settled" that an issue on appeal will not be considered if it is 
"not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument." Bowles v. Pro lndiviso, 
Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Even where an issue is "explicitly set forth in the 
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party's brief' as one of the bases for appeal, if it is "only mentioned in passing and not 
supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." 
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382-83, 234 P.3d 699, 706-07 (2010) 
(citing Inama v. Boise Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 
456 (2003))." 
Without question, the Stevenson and Trotter decisions are additional 
links in a long and unbroken line of precedent applying the methodology and 
lessons of Rule 35(a)(6), I.A.R. In short, except in the rarest of cases, this Court 
has made it abundantly clear that it is not in the business of rehabilitating or 
rescuing a party's failed advocacy. Why then, should a district court be allowed to 
conduct a case by any different standard in its decision making process? 
Constitutionally, the playing field should be level in any court. Turning now to 
the issues on appeal. 
1) Under I.C. Section 55-908, on the Complaint's Count One 
(the fraudulent transfer claim), did the District Court err by 
granting summary judgment against the sole answering 
defendant based, wholly or in part, upon the default of the 
corporate co-defendant? 
On April 1, 2011, the instant action was filed as a two (2) count complaint 
against Appellant, his wife, Jolene and Sterling Mortgage, a Montana 
corporation. Count One sought to void the construction indebtedness and 
mortgage between Appellant and Sterling based upon LC. Section 55-901 and 
Appellant, Philip P. McGimpsey's 
Opening Brief 
13 
an alleged fraudulent transfer. Record, Pages 21-22, Complaint. Appellant 
answered the complaint on May 6, 2011 denying all claims or allegations of an 
unlawful transfer. The Answer also requested a trial by jury on all factual and 
damage issues to be decided. Record, Pages 117-136, Answer. Jolene and 
Sterling did not answer the Complaint. Default judgments were entered 
against Jolene and Sterling on June 6, 2011. Record, Page 3, ROA. 
The leading case and the gold standard on the subject of default 
judgments in actions involving multiple defendants is Prow v. De La Vega, 
82 U.S. 552 (1872). The high Court held in Prow where a complaint alleges that 
defendants are jointly liable and one of them defaults, judgment should not be 
entered against the defaulting defendant until the matter has been adjudicated 
with regard to all of the defendants. Id. at 554. Consistent with the holding in 
Prow, if an action against an answering defendant is ultimately decided in his 
favor, then the action should be dismissed against both the answering and 
defaulting defendants. Federal courts have extended the rule in Prow to apply 
to defendants who are similarly situated, even if not jointly and severally liable. 
See, Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps., Inc., 740 F. 2nd 1499, 1512 
(11th Cir.1984). With regard to this case, Prow's holding is clearly implemented 
by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P. 
Appellant, Philip P. McGimpsey's 
Opening Brief 
14 
Correspondingly, Rule 9(b), I.R.C.P., Fraud ... , requires that in all 
averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud shall be stated with 
particularity. Simple notice pleading will not suffice. A heightened form of 
pleading is clearly required. 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the U.S. Supreme 
Court set forth the standard for evaluating a federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion and by 
extension a Rule 9(b), I.R.C.P., fraud claim. To avoid dismissal, a complaint must 
include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 
547. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not suffice. 
Id. at 555. See, also, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Rather, the 
complaint must set forth sufficient facts to "nudge the claim across the line from 
conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Stated differently, the 
plaintiff must "assert facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [he] has 
the right he claims ... , rather than facts that are merely consistent with 
such a right." See also, Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 
(8th Cir.2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-57). 
Thus, the question becomes whether Count One in the Plaintiffs 
Complaint legally satisfied the Twombly "facially plausible" standard and by 
Appellant, Philip P. McGimpsey's 
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extension Idaho's Rule 9(b)'s requirement of particularity. The District Court 
below never discussed or expressly ruled on this point of law. 
Count One of the Complaint, beginning at Page 14, alleged a violation 
of Idaho's Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, LC. Section 55-901 et. seq. Record, 
Page 21. Under Idaho's Title 55, the determination of "actual intent" and 
whether a fraudulent conveyance or transfer occurred is made on a case-by-case 
basis, as there is no precise formula for determining whether a transaction was a 
fraudulent conveyance. J.C. Section 55-913. The question of fraudulent 
intent is one of fact, and not of law. I.C. Section 55-908. The 
determination of actual fraudulent intent is not a neat, clean or comfortable 
process. Usually, it involves weighing a series of indicia of fraud, or more 
commonly, badges of fraud, for guidance. It cannot be said often enough 
especially in a Rule 56 summary judgment setting: The question of 
fraudulent intent is one of fact, and not of law. More on this topic 
later in this brief. 
In a clear and mistaken departure from LC. Section 55-913(2)'s listed 
factors, Plaintiff speculated on nine more custom indices of the allegedly 
fraudulent transfer between this Defendant and Sterling Mortgage. See, Record, 
Page 21; Complaint, Paragraph 67. The proof of these "badges," however 
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imaginary, also remains a factual inquiry using a reasonable man standard under 
LC. Section 55-908. 
Correspondingly, while a showing of one or more of a seemingly endless 
list of badges may be admissible as to the actual intent of this Defendant-
Mortgagor, such a showing in and of itself does not create a presumption that a 
fraudulent obligation had been incurred. Badges of fraud do not establish fraud 
per se. Once again, LC. Section 55-908 applies. Bottom line: Not all transfers 
or obligations incurred should be voided just because they don't fit into a neat, 
clean mold by running afoul of one or two badges. 
I'm going to return for a moment to the pitfalls of the "indices" listed by 
the Plaintiff in Paragraph 67 of its Complaint. The federal Court's words found 
on Page 15 above are a constant reminder of Idaho's Rule 9(b) threshold: 
Stated differently, the plaintiff must "assert facts that affirmatively and 
plausibly suggest that [he] has the right he claims ... , rather than facts 
that are merely consistent with such a right." 
The indices of alleged fraud listed in Paragraph 67 of the Complaint are 
not statutory indicators of fraud. They are more akin to the speculations of one 
who did not, or does not, truly understand the flexibility of a proprietary 
mortgage transaction, or its clearly designated governing foreign law. Logically 
speaking, if a Plaintiff is at liberty to generate a custom list of badges, there 
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wouldn't be a single commercial transaction that could withstand scrutiny for 
fraud. 
Rule 9(b), I.R.C.P., requires particularity in pleading fraud. Rule 12(b)(6), 
I.R.C.P., requires sufficiency. The Complaint is nineteen pages in length. 
Nineteen (19) pages! You would surely expect that somewhere in those nineteen 
pages the Plaintiff would have taken the time to discuss the conflict of laws 
principles at issue in this case. The Promissory Note and the recorded Mortgage 
are by their terms clearly governed by Montana law. Where are the allegations or 
averments that either or both are unenforceable commercial paper transactions 
under applicable Montana law? The Complaint is utterly silent on this critical 
point. In a nutshell, the District Court delivered a perfect legal Catch 22: 
A non-resident mortgagee (Sterling) that can sue the Defendant on the 
underlying Promissory Note in one state (Montana) and a resident plaintiff that 
can sue the Defendant to void the underlying Mortgage in another state (Idaho)? 
Measured against the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and 
Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs complaint simply cannot pass muster for Rule 56 
purposes. Where exactly is the "particularity" of pleading that is required to 
enable this Defendant to present a fact driven defense to a jury? It's certainly 
not found in Paragraph 67 of the Complaint. On its face, the Complaint in 
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Count One struggles to find any roots or support in LC. Section 55-913. Other 
than by inference, that is. If one is free to infer, then the sky is the limit. Any 
Plaintiff can cement fraud simply by generating a custom list of badges that fit 
any fact pattern. Especially, in a proprietary mortgage situation. For this 
Defendant, the probabilities are all but impossible to beat. Sooner or later, one or 
two or three "custom" badges will be found to exist and presto -- instant fraud. 
Logically speaking, if LC. Section 55-908 clearly and unambiguously 
provides that: 
"Fraud is a question of fact. In all cases arising under the 
provisions of chapters 5 to 9 inclusive, of this title, the question 
of fraudulent intent is one of fact, and not of law; nor can any 
transfer or charge be adjudged fraudulent solely on the ground that it 
was not made for a valuable consideration." Emphasis supplied. 
Then, it follows that the District Court could not have properly granted 
summary judgment against this sole answering defendant after a timely jury 
demand had been made without either a) assuming facts not in evidence, b) 
inserting Plaintiffs arguments that clearly weren't made or, c) imputing Sterling's 
default to this Defendant. In short, in its haste to grant summary judgment, the 
District Court clearly bypassed this Court's LA.R. 35(a)(6) standards and 
this Defendant's LC. Section 55-908's statutory protections. 
Constitutionally, every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard 
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in an impartial court of law upon every question involving rights or interests 
before he/ she is affected by a judicial decision on the issues presented. 
When a party is not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard, a judgment 
is void. In the case of Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45,382 P.2nd 910 (1963), 
the judgment was void because the trial court entered judgment against the 
makers of a promissory note without giving the makers an opportunity to 
present evidence regarding their affirmative defense of lack of consideration. 
The lessons in Prather certainly apply to the Answer filed in this case. Bottom 
line: The District Court's September 29, 2011 Final Judgment and all of the 
proceedings founded upon it are null and void and should now be vacated. 
I turn now to a heavyweight and truly original appeal issue: 
2) Under Rule 54, I.R.C.P., did the District Court err by 
awarding Plaintiff's counsel its unpaid or unearned 
attorney fees and costs? 
On the surface, the above issue presents much like the Rule against 
Perpetuities. Easily stated, but because of its scope likely requires volumes 
for a truly logical and workable explanation. On April 26, 2012, in Stonebrook 
Construction, L.L.C. v. Chase Home Finance, L.L.C., et. al., 2012 Opinion 
No. 68, Docket No. 37868, Justice Horton wrote: 
"This Court exercises "free review over interpreting a statute's meaning 
andapplyingthefactstothelaw." VFP VC, 141 Idaho at 331, 109P.3dat719. 
The standard this Court applies when interpreting statutes is well established: 
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Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's 
literal words. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
courts give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. Only where the language is ambiguous will this Court look 
to rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of 
proposed interpretations. 
Curlee, 148 Idaho at 398, 224 P.3d at 465 (citing Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. 
Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006) (internal 
citations omitted)). A statute "is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be 
uncertain as to its meaning." Payette River Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of 
Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999) (citing Ada Cnty. v. Gibson, 
126 Idaho 854, 856, 893 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct. App. 1995)). "However, ambiguity is not 
established merely because the parties present differing interpretations to the court." Id." 
Rule 54(e)(5), I.R.C.P., provides that "attorney fees, when allowable by 
statute or contract, shall be deemed as costs in an action .... " See, BECO 
Construction Company, Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc . ... , Idaho __ , 
233 P.3d 1216 (2010). See, specifically, Footnote 1 on Page 6 of the opinion. 
Correspondingly, Rule 54(d)(1)(C) clearly states: 
" Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, 
such party shall be entitled to the following costs, actually paid, 
as a matter of right: ... " Emphasis supplied. 
As an opening proposition, I would advance the argument that based 
upon Rule 54's use of the words "actually paid" that the attorney fees and cost 
provisions are in the nature of an indemnity agreement. Thus, unless the words 
"actually paid11 can somehow be found to be ambiguous, a party that does not pay, 
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or is not under a binding obligation to pay, attorney fees or costs is not entitled to 
an award of such under Rule 54. 
Webster's dictionary defines the word "actually" as: in act or in fact. 
Similarly, the word "paid" is defined as: receiving pay or compensated. 
Combining the two definitions yields a common sense and practical result. 
"Actually paid" means receiving pay in fact. To think otherwise would be to veer 
into the well worn and long ago decided world of pro se party entitlements. 
This Court and the Court of Appeals have left little doubt that pro se litigants, 
including attorneys litigating prose, are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
See, Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 
1989). See also, Barbee v. WMA Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 397, 146 P.3d 657, 663 
(2006); Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148 
(1999). 
Admissions against interest rarely result in a pleasant outcome for the 
declarant. On Page 8 of the December 1, 2011 Reply in Support of Plaintiffs 
Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements, and Attorney Fees, Plaintiffs counsel 
admits and argues: 
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"The statute certainly provides that only costs that are actually paid can be 
awarded. That same language is not used when describing attorney fees. Attorney 
fees are frequently awarded even though they have not yet been actually paid, i.e. in a 
contingency case. In fact, in this case, four attorney fees judgments have already 
been awarded without any determination whether those fees were "actually paid." 
Counsel for Plaintiff has yet to be paid for any of the work that it has performed 
over the last few years, work that it has been forced to perform because of Defendant's 
improper misuse of the judicial system. Counsel for Plaintiff will finally receive its just 
compensation from Plaintiff for all attorney fees incurred once the attorney fee liens are 
finally satisfied, either by Defendant voluntarily or through foreclosure of his real 
property. Defendant did not cite any cases to support his claim that attorney fees 
cannot be awarded if the attorney fees have not been "actually paid." Counsel for 
Plaintiff was unable to find any case in Idaho or elsewhere where an "actually paid" 
requirement was discussed with regard to attorney fees. The cases do not discuss 
this point because it is obvious that the statutes do not require that attorney fees 
are "actually paid" before they are awarded as a judgment. Defendant is obligated 
to pay for the reasonable attorney fees incurred because of his frivolous litigation, 
irrespective of whether those fees have yet been actually paid to counsel by 
Plaintiff." See, Record, Page 275. Emphasis supplied. 
In point of fact, despite this Appellant's early Rule 17(a), I.R.C.P., efforts to 
ferret out the real party in interest, Plaintiffs counsel has now clearly admitted 
that present and past attorney fees have not been "actually paid" by their putative 
client. Nor has Plaintiffs counsel supplied evidence or clear proof of any binding 
obligation to do so. See, Record, Pages 137-145, Appellant's Rule 17 Motion. 
Thus, under Rule 54, I.R.C.P., as the true party in interest, and more importantly, 
as an attorney pro se litigant, Plaintiffs counsel was not properly entitled to an 
award of their unpaid attorney fees in this case, or judging from their admissions 
against interest, the past case as well. 
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"The bottom line in any award of attorney fees is reasonableness." 
Luttunich v. Luttunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749-50, 185 P.3rd 258, 261-62 (2008). 
The challenge, of course, is to reasonably define reasonableness. For example, 
is it reasonable to award fees to a law firm who doesn't really do the work? 
Most everyone would generally agree that it is not. 
Plaintiffs March 30, 2012 fee and cost request draws a striking and 
interesting contrast between the higher and lower courts as to pleading and 
practice and the Rule 35(a)(6), I.A.R., standards. Consider this Court's 
methodology with what transpired recently in this case. Beginning on Page 2, 
Line 6 of the December 22, 2011, Notice of Intent ... , the District Court wrote: 
"Island Woods opposed on December 19, 2011, but inadequately 
addressed the Motion - simply arguing, without more, that McGimpsey's 
motion was frivolous and without foundation. McGimpsey responded. While the 
Court agrees that McGimpsey's Motion is clearly frivolous, because the Court 
intends to deny McGimpsey's Motion on grounds not specifically raised by 
Island Woods, ... " Emphasis supplied. See, Record, Page 287. 
True to the Court's declared intent and ostensibly out of "an abundance 
of caution," the District Court then went on to author fourteen (14) pages of 
historical background and analysis in aid of the Plaintiffs non-existent advocacy. 
Given the unmistakable tenor and direction of the District Court's December 22, 
2011 Notice of Intent ... , at least from the Plaintiffs perspective, what manner of 
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fool wouldn't cheerlead for a court? I certainly would have. Friends with black 
robes in high places are good to have. 
Similarly, on Page 2, beginning at Line 11 of the District Court's January 9, 
2012 Order granting attorney fees and denying my Rule 59(e) Motion is found: 
"While the Court agrees that McGimpsey's Motion and his allegations were 
clearly frivolous, because the Court intended to deny McGimpsey's Motion on 
bases not discussed by Island Woods, out of an abundance of caution, 
the Court gave both parties notice of the bases for its decision that it 
was not biased and allowed the parties to file simultaneous responses by 
January 3, 2012." Emphasis supplied. See, Record, Page 319. 
So here's my question: Who deserved to be paid here? Was it the 
person who moved the ball down court, or was it the cheerleader? And, was it 
reasonable, or ethical for that matter, for the District Court to award fees and 
costs on key motions to lawyers that really didn't do the work? 
At the appellate level the answers to the foregoing questions are 
reasonably clear. At the district court level, based upon the May 24, 2012 
Memorandum and Order, the answers are most certainly gauzy. Here's a simple 
equation that sums up my point: No law cited + no arguments made 
+ no authority provided = NO WORK= NO PAY! Let's give credit 
where credit is due. The District Court did the work. Plaintiffs counsel 
certainly didn't deserve the fee award. Moving on to the next issue. 
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3) Did the District Court err under J.C. Section 11-102 by 
allowing the sheriffs sale to go forward based upon a 
demonstrated mathematically and financially defective 
writ of execution? 
LC. Section 11-102 clearly states: 
"Form of writ. The writ of execution must be issued in the name of the people, 
sealed with the seal of the court, and subscribed by the clerk, and be directed to 
the sheriff, and it must intelligently refer to the judgment, stating the 
court, the county where the judgment roll is filed, and if it be for money, the 
amount thereof, and the amount actually due thereon, and if made 
payable in a specified kind of money, or currency, the execution must also state 
the kind of money or currency in which the judgment is payable, and must 
require the sheriff substantially as follows: ... " Emphasis supplied. 
Once again, we return to the practical lessons of the Stonebrook 
Construction case discussed above and the plain meaning of the words 
"actually due" found in LC. Section 11-102. 
On February 13, 2012, I filed a motion under Rule 62, LR.C.P. asking the 
District Court to quash the Amended Writ and Levy against Lot 74 based upon 
demonstrated mathematical and financial defects. Record, Pages 349-351. 
A brief in support of the Rule 62 Motion was filed on February 27, 2012, prior to 
hearing. Record, Pages 364-371. Attached to the brief as Exhibit A (Record, 
Page 371) was an Excel spreadsheet that clearly demonstrated to the District 
Court the mathematical and financial errors in the Amended Writ. A hearing was 
held on March 15, 2012. Following each parties' presentation, the District Court, 
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without explanation, orally ruled that the Rule 62 Motion was denied. The oral 
ruling was followed by a written Order, prepared by Plaintiffs counsel. Record, 
Pages 358-360. The written Order, like the bench ruling, did not address the 
Amended Writ's erroneous math and "actually due" problem. 
Of all of the disciplines that intersect with the law, principles of 
mathematics should be the most predictable. After all, what could be more 
certain than Principal x Interest Rate x Time? In theory, given the proliferation 
of inexpensive calculators, LC. Section 11-102's "actually due" requirement 
should have been a relatively easy task to accomplish. Apparently not! 
Rule 69, I.R.C.P., clearly provides that: 
" ... a writ of execution shall not issue for an amount other than the 
face amount of the judgment, and costs and attorney fees approved by the 
court, without an affidavit of the party or the party's attorney 
verifying the computation of the amount due under the judgment. 
" 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why the District Court 
would allow the sheriffs sale of Lot 74 to go forward based upon a statutorily 
defective writ of execution and its equally defective levy. Correspondingly, 
given the obligations set forth in Rule 69, I.R.C.P., it is equally perplexing why 
Plaintiffs counsel wouldn't take the time to correct the math on a knowingly 
defective writ. Especially, a writ that asked for more money than the original 
Appellant, Philip P. McGimpsey's 
Opening Brief 
27 
judgments stated. In mathematical terms, this issue can be summed up with a 
simple equation: Bad Math = Defective Writ & Levy= Invalid Sheriff's 
Sale. 
4) Under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., did the District Court err by 
orally dismissing the sole answering Defendant's three 
counterclaims without requiring any proof or evidence 
of the Plaintiff's affirmative defenses of issue and claims 
preclusion? 
Once again, Rule 35(a)(6), I.A.R., standards will be used to challenge 
and question the District Court's dismissal of this answering Defendant's 
three counterclaims via summary judgment. Record, Pages 129-132, Answer. 
Record, Page 218, Final Judgment. 
Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on June 13, 2011 followed 
by an Amended Memorandum in support on July 8, 2011. Record, Pages 166-
188. Neither the motion nor the lengthy supporting memorandum made any 
mention of the Defendant's three (3) counterclaims. On July 14, 2011, Plaintiffs 
counsel filed a one-of-a-kind and truly odd pleading titled, "Plaintiffs 
Clarification ... " Record, Pages 189-191. On Page 2 of the Clarification, Plaintiffs 
counsel unabashedly declared: 
"Plaintiff, in its memorandum in support of summary judgment, did not raise any 
arguments regarding the counterclaims because Plaintiff believes the counterclaims are 
patently invalid and merit no discussion. All of Defendant's counterclaims are related to 
issues that were already fully resolved in prior litigation and Defendant's collateral attack 
Appellant, Philip P. McGimpsey's 
Opening Brief 
28 
is barred by the doctrines of claim and/or issue preclusion. To the extent Uetendant has 
arguments to the contrary, Plaintiff has filed this clarification in order to allow Defendant 
sufficient opportunity to raise those arguments in his opposition brief to the motion for 
summary judgment." Emphasis supplied. 
The applicable principles of proper pleading and practice were discussed 
in Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, et. al., 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3rd 699 
(2010). To wit: 
"We will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and authority 
in the opening brief." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524,528, 
181 P.3rd 450,454 (2008); see also Idaho App. R. 35(a)(6)." 
"Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as 
one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and 
not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be 
considered by this court." Inama v. Boise County ex rel. Bd. of 
Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3rd 450, 456 (2003)." 
Distilled to its essence, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, its 
amended supporting memorandum and the oddball tag along Clarification 
~- ~ -
pleading are truly insufficient to satisfy the above noted holdings. Despite the 
obvious attempt by Plaintiffs counsel to plug a gaping hole in the opening volley, 
the July 14, 2011 Clarification pleading fails in a number of critical ways: 
First, while the Clarification might have used the right buzzwords like 
claims preclusion or issue preclusion, there certainly was no argument or 
authority presented to support such. The kindest thing that can be said for the 
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Clarification's method and style of pleading is that it is nothing more than a drive 
by effort, or to paraphrase the Inama court, a "mention in passing." 
Secondly, the Clarification pleading is not a complete or adequate 
defense to the three Counterclaims. In its June 17, 2011 Reply to the three 
Counterclaims, Plaintiffs counsel certainly raised the affirmative defenses of 
claims and issue preclusion. Record, Pages 162-165. But, as this Court has held: 
"Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting 
it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance 
of the evidence." 
See, Oregon Mutual Insurance Company v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company of Idaho, 148 Idaho 47, 218 P.3rd 391 (2009). See also, Ticor Title Co. 
v. Sanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3rd 613,616 (2007). 
How then was dismissal of any the three counterclaims even remotely 
possible under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., given that the Plaintiff offered absolutely 
no cogent argument or cited authority for dismissal in its Rule 56 Motion, 
the supporting Amended Memorandum, the Clarification pleading, the reply 
brief, or at hearing? The simple answer is that one cannot prevail on summary 
judgment by simply throwing out a few buzzwords and then calling on your 
opponent to make a self-defeating argument. Plaintiffs counsel erred badly and 
so did the District Court for allowing such glaring shortcomings. 
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5) Under Rules 15, 54(c) and 56, I.R.C.P., did the District Court 
err by allowing the Plaintiff, sans motion or order, to add a 
claim for a Fourth Judgment post-default to the Complaint 
Count Two--the declaratory judgment action? 
Rule 54(c), I.R.C.P., Demand for judgment, states in applicable part that: 
"A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in 
amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment." 
In Count Two, on Page 15 of Plaintiffs April 1, 2011 Complaint (Record, 
Pages 22-23), the District Court was asked to validate each of the three (3) 
judgments listed in Paragraphs 75-77 and enter a declaratory judgment 
accordingly. My May 6, 2011 Answer with its general and affirmative defenses 
and counterclaims timely responded to Count Two. On July 8, 2011, Plaintiffs 
counsel attempted to quietly slip a "fourth judgment" into this lawsuit without 
a proper Rule 15, I.R.C.P., amendment via the Amended Memorandum in 
support of summary judgment. Record, Page 172. Consider the following 
admission by Plaintiffs counsel found on Page 172, Record, last two sentences: 
"The facts regarding McGimpsey's unsuccessful appeal and the Fourth 
Judgment were inadvertently left out of the Complaint. The Fourth 
Judgment was recently recorded in the Ada County Recorder's Office on 
June 7, 2011, as Instrument No. 111046347." (Counsel Aff., Paragraphs 8, 19, 
& 20 at Exhs. F, Q & R.)" 
The major problem with this late-to-the-party effort is that there were 
two defaulted defendants that were served with a complaint that was missing any 
mention of the "Fourth Judgment." In plain fact, the "Fourth Judgment" wasn't 
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filed of record until June 7, 2011. I'm not going to waste a lot of time discussing 
why a late filed claim may be slightly unfair or prejudicial to any or all of the 
defendants, except to note that the Fourth Judgment increased the Plaintiffs 
April 1, 2011 prayer request by approximately fifty percent (50%). 
During the run up to summary judgment, Plaintiff had a classic Sophie's 
choice: Either drop any consideration of the Fourth Judgment from the case, 
or file a proper Rule 15, I.R.C.P., motion to amend the original complaint. 
Plaintiff did neither under the watchful eye and with the blessing of the District 
Court. Under Rule 54(c), I.R.C.P., if a default judgment cannot be different in 
kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment, then 
it follows that facts "inadvertently" left out of an original complaint which 
increase the amount prayed for, fundamentally give rise to due process with 
notice and opportunity to be heard by all of the defendants, defaulted or 
otherwise. Summary judgment under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., should not have been 
granted to a Plaintiff that violated Rule 54(c) and bypassed Rule 15's amendment 
process. This was clear err by the District Court. 
6) Under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., based upon the evidence and 
exhibits, did the District Court err by constructively 
reclassifying the ownership interests of the two individual 
defendants' homestead from tenant-in-common separate 
property interests to a quasi community property interest? 
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Beginning on Page 16 of the Rule 56 amended supporting memorandum 
(Record, Page 181), Plaintiff advanced the unsupported and speculative 
arguments that somehow the McGimpseys' separate property interests created in 
2001 became community property, and through sheer judicial magic, this 
Defendant's individual judgments became a community debt. The facts 
surrounding the Property's purchase mandate otherwise. 
Lawyers in general are notorious at distilling facts to suit the slant of 
their arguments. On Page 2 in the Introduction section of Plaintiffs 
memorandum in support of summary judgment, we find this rather clever 
distillation: 
"The McGimpseys were married in 1993 and previously lived in Montana. 
In 2001, they purchased real property at 335 E. River Quarry... In 
September 2004, they began construction of a residence on the Property" 
Record, Page 167. 
To be fair and correct from a separate property vs. community property 
perspective, the factual statements should have read: 
The McGimpseys were married in Montana in 1993. In January 2001, 
as indicated in the corporate warranty deed of record, the McGimpseys, 
as Montana residents, took title as undivided tenants in common to the 
property located at 335 E. River Quarry Dr. 
In September 2004, while Montana residents, the McGimpseys began 
construction of a residence on the Property. 
From a legal perspective, the contrasting factual statements are, as 
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Mark Twain once quipped, much like the difference between lightening and 
a lightening bug. One small word change with one huge difference in outcome. 
From a far more important legal perspective, Plaintiffs magic conversion 
attempt totally ignored this Court's holding in Twin Falls Bank & Trust v. Holley, 
111 Idaho 349, 723 P.2d 893 (1986). The major holding in this case effectively 
and significantly restricted creditors' rights under a property settlement 
agreement by charting a new path for Idaho residents. In summary, this Court's 
decision precludes creditors of the community from pursuing the community 
property distributed to a non-debtor spouse unless the creditor can allege and 
prove that the spouse ordered to pay the community debt was not awarded 
sufficient assets to satisfy the debt. See, Holley, 111 Idaho at 354, 723 P2d at 
While the facts in this situation are certainly different than those in Holley, 
the legal conclusions are spot on. If a downstream conversion of community 
property to separate property can be respected and upheld as in Holley, certainly 
real estate that has always been held in separate property interests can be 
afforded the same legal protections. Montana is a common law property state 
and does not recognize either community property, or tenancy by entirety. 
Married residents are allowed to hold and maintain separate or joint property 
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interests as determined by the form of ownership. A warranty deed taken as 
undivided tenants in common (Record, Page 214.) creates separate property 
interests subject to generally accepted principles of contribution upon sale or 
disposition. See, M.C.A. (Montana Code Annotated) Sections 70-29-101, 70-29-
321. In this respect, Idaho's law is no different. See, LC. Sections 6-501, 6-520. 
The tenancy of Lot 7 4 has not changed since its purchase. It started out 
in 2001 as undivided tenants-in-common and remained throughout the course of 
this lawsuit as undivided tenants-in-common. See, Record, Page 214. Measured 
against Rule 35(a)(6), I.AR., standards, there was simply nothing factually of 
record, or for that matter introduced into the record, to indicate or remotely 
suggest that Lot 74 was community property. From a Rule 56, I.R.C.P., 
perspective, this issue should have been a non-starter. Plaintiffs speculative 
"presumption" that all property acquired after marriage is community property 
is, in this instance, unsupported by the facts surrounding the Montana residency 
at the time of purchase and the corporate warranty deed of record. The intent of 
the McGimpseys of Billings, Montana was clear. The Property, Lot 74, was to be 
held in separate property interests as undivided tenants-in- common, not 
community property. 
For a correct summary judgment to be have been entered, Rule 56, 
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I.R.C.P., requires a genuine absence of material fact and propositions oflaw 
in support. The District Court erred by ignoring the clear and unambiguous 
evidence of Lot 74's ownership, and further erred by allowing the sheriffs sale of 
Lot 74 to go forward and be accounted for as a sale of community property, rather 
than undivided tenant-in-common owned property. 
7) Did the District Court err by allowing the sheriff's sale of 
Lot 74 to go forward without requiring the Plaintiff to comply 
with the execution process governing homesteads set forth in 
I.C. Section 55-1101, et. seq.? 
On September 29, 2011@ 4- P.M., a putative "Final Judgment" was 
entered by the Ada Clerk of Court pursuant to Rule 58(a), I.R.C.P. Record, 
Pages 218-219. On October 4, 2011, the District Court signed a follow-up order 
drafted by Plaintiffs counsel directed to the orally granted summary judgment 
ruling. Record, Pages 220-225. This Order also provided a basic blueprint for 
the execution sale of the two individual Defendants' Lot 74 homestead. On 
Page 3, Paragraph 6, (Record, Page 222) the following appears: 
"That the Property be foreclosed and sold in one parcel by the Sheriff 
of Ada County, State of Idaho, at public auction in the letter and 
manner prescribed by law, ... " Emphasis supplied. 
In an attempt to follow the dictates of the District Court's October 4, 2011 
Order, Plaintiffs counsel filed an Amended Writ of Execution dated January 27, 
2012, a Notice of Levy dated January 31, 2012 and a Notice of Sale dated 
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February 1, 2012. Procedurally, Plaintiffs counsel was doing pretty well up to the 
January 31, 2012 Notice of Levy. Then, the relevant law went missing. 
Wrongly and without justification or explanation, Plaintiffs counsel threw 
statute to the wind by utterly failing to comply with the provisions governing 
homesteads and their sale under an execution as set forth in Idaho Code Title 55, 
Chapters 10 and 11. Specifically, there was zero effort and zero compliance with 
Idaho Code Sections 55-1101, et seq. Record, Pages 337-348. 
LC. Section 55-1101 specifically governs homesteads and is the statutory 
starting point for any execution sale. If the judgment sought to be enforced is not 
a case within the judgment classes set forth in LC. Section 55-1005, the judgment 
creditor applies to the probate judge of the county where the homestead is 
located for an order to proceed with an execution sale. From the face of the 
Plaintiffs Amended Writ of Execution, it is abundantly clear that Plaintiffs 
putative judgments, regardless of their legal sufficiency, are not within the classes 
of judgments set forth in LC. Section 55-1005. Hence, Plaintiff, as a judgment 
creditor, was fundamentally required to follow the statutory mechanism 
beginning with LC. Section 55-1102 and ending with Section 55-1115 to legally 
and properly execute against the Defendants' Lot 74 homestead property. 
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In what became a repetitive pattern of error riddled pleading and practice, 
Plaintiffs counsel made absolutely no effort to follow the letter or the manner of 
the law, arguing instead to the District Court that following this law was merely 
an option as long as the value of the homestead could confidently exceed the 
homestead exemption. The fundamental flaw in the execution process is obvious. 
Somewhere between Paragraph 6 and Paragraph 9 of the District Court's 
October 4, 2011 Order, Plaintiffs counsel failed to follow, incorporate, or even 
reference, the homestead execution sale mechanism called for in Idaho Code Title 
55, Chapters 10 and 11. Surely the words "letter and manner prescribed by law" 
chosen by Plaintiffs counsel and subscribed to by the District Court were 
intended to be more than filler or hollow promises. After all, we are talking about 
a homestead property here. And, as will be discussed at more length in the issue 
that follows, the whole execution sale process is about more than just value. 
There is also the parties' intangible right to a fair sale in a public forum populated 
by willing independent buyers. Plaintiffs charade of fairness cloaked by the 
words "letter and manner prescribed by law" ignored the law, perverted the 
process and tainted the outcome. The homestead, Lot 74, should have been 
subjected to the rights and protections found in Idaho Code Title 55, Chapters 10 
and 11. To think otherwise, is just plain wrong. 
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It has often been said that: "There is no perfection in art or law." 
However, Plaintiffs failure or unwillingness to follow the "letter and manner 
prescribed by law" called for in the District Court's October 4, 2011 Order 
should not have been a springboard for a defective execution sale against this 
Defendant's homestead. Moving on to the last issue. 
8) Can a valid execution sale be made against a homestead 
owned by a husband Gudgment debtor) and wife (non-
judgment debtor) as undivided tenants-in-common without 
a pre-sale appraisal and a determination of the tenants' 
respective ownership interests? 
On February 22, 2012, Governor Otter signed Senate Bill 1222 into law. 
Senate Bill 1222 made changes to LC. Sections 55-1101 and 1103, effective July 1, 
2012. The changes, in essence, moved the petition and appraisement process for 
a homestead's execution sale from the probate court to the district court. The 
petition and appraisement process itself remains unchanged. 
As discussed above under Issue #6, the tenancy of the Lot 74 homestead 
property has not changed since its purchase. It started out in 2001 as undivided 
tenants-in-common and remains to this day as undivided tenants-in-common. 
See, Record, Page 214. Predictably, the law governing an execution sale of a 
homestead is a bit more complicated in the case of a homestead owned by two 
undivided tenants-in-common where only one tenant is a judgment debtor. 
Appellant, Philip P. McGimpsey's 
Opening Brief 
39 
The issue of an execution sale of an undivided tenant-in-common owned 
homestead is one of first impression in Idaho. As a starting point, please 
consider the guidance found in Ingebretsen v. McNamer, 137 CalApp.3d 957, 
187 Cal.Rptr.529, Civ. No. 51806. Court of Appeals of California, 
First Appellate District, Division Three (1982): 
"Case law adhering to the California Constitution has long held that the homestead 
statutes are to be construed liberally on behalf of the homesteader. Swearingen v. Byrne 
(1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 580, 584 [136 Cal.Rptr. 736]; Schoenfeld v. Norberg, supra, 11 
Cal.App.3d 755, 764. This is well illustrated in the Swearingen case. There it was held 
that the recording of an abstract of judgment, which normally establishes a lien upon the 
real property of the judgment debtor (Code Civ. Proc., 674) does not establish a lien on 
homesteaded property. Only after there has been a levy of execution on the excess 
value of the property over the homestead exemption does a lien attach. 
While Swearingen does not address the question of retroactivity of exemption amount, it 
does show that the right to execute on a judgment does not automatically allow the 
judgment creditor to satisfy his judgment with the excess value of property over the 
homestead exemption. To give maximum protection to the homesteader, the creditor 
must first take the procedural steps prescribed in the Civil Code, and the court must 
then determine that there is excess over the homestead exemption which can be sold 
to satisfy the judgment. Civ. Code, 1250; In re Rauer's Collection Co. (1948) 87 
Cal.App.2d 248,254 [196 P.2d 803]." Emphasis supplied. 
While certainly important, LC. Section 55-1101, et. seq., is not, however, 
the whole or only process to be considered when a homestead property is sold 
under a writ of execution. The laws governing judgments and the ownership of 
real property have to be integrated into the process and considered as well. 
See, J.C. Section 6-501, Section 6-520 and Section 32-906(2). 
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Under the Plaintiffs Amended Writ, the Ada Sheriff sold the Lot 74 
homestead which was owned by two people as undivided tenants-in-common, 
only one of which was a judgment debtor, without any appraisal guidance 
whatsoever. How exactly, without an appraisement process to determine the 
judgment debtor's interest versus the non-judgment debtor's interest, was a 
proper execution sale possible? And, pray tell, how was Lot 74's fair value 
determined without an appraisal? Perhaps this is why there was a $328,000 
difference between the Ada Assessor's value ($609,000) and the high bid 
($281,000) at the sheriffs sale? After all, it isn't just the amount of the 
homestead exemption that sets the correct minimum bid at auction. Both the 
judgment debtor's and non-judgment debtor's respective tenant-in-common 
interests should have been algebraically factored into the equation to determine 
a minimum sales price. To think otherwise, would lay waste to the law governing 
judgments by allowing the judgment creditor to execute against an innocent 
party's ownership interest without just or adequate compensation. In this case, 
this is especially true for the last two post-default judgments listed in the 
Amended Writ that the non-judgment debtor/owner was never given notice of, 
or a reasonable opportunity to defend against. 
Lastly, under LC. Section 55-1101, et. seq., without an appraisement 
process, how could the Plaintiff in good faith represent via affidavit, or otherwise, 
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that the sole judgment debtor, as an undivided tenant-in-common, had any 
interest in excess of the homestead exemption to sell? If the homestead statutes 
are to be construed liberally on behalf of the homesteaders, a mere guess at 
ownership percentages or valuation by opposing counsel simply won't do. 
In this undivided tenant-in-common homestead situation where one 
tenant is a judgment debtor and the other not, the reversible error is obvious: 
Without an appraisal under LC. Section 55-1101, et. seq., Plaintiffs Amended 
Writ and Levy legally failed to set the proper amount of the minimum bid 
required at the sheriffs sale. The March 27, 2012 sheriffs sale of Lot 74 is 
plainly and unquestionably defective and should be set aside. 




If there was one lesson to be learned from this lawsuit as far case 
management is concerned, it would most certainly be derived from the District 
Court's unwavering demeanor. Like a heat seeking missile intent on destroying 
its target, the District Court was not about to let opposing facts, or controlling 
law, or this Court's clear precedent upset a predestined and painful outcome. 
Every motion that I filed, every argument that I made was summarily deemed 
frivolous. However, when my opponent faltered in his advocacy, rather than 
finding a classic case of frivolity, the District Court was quick to not only supply 
the shortcomings, but went on to rule favorably on its own work product. 
Perhaps the law is like love, promising more than it will ever deliver. However, 
under the simple minded notions of fair play and substantial justice, a District 
Court should be required to play by the same rules as everyone else. The I.AR. 
35(a)(6) standards discussed throughout this brief are grounded as much in 
common sense, as they are in the law itself. If any party is allowed to win a case 
without offering solid undisputed facts, cogent arguments or supporting 
propositions of law and cited authority, then something is dreadfully amiss. 
Viewed in this light, a lawsuit could be reduced to simply picking an activist 
jurist, and in essence attaching blank paper to the body of any pleading. 
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When a case is measured , not by the quality of the evidence, or the 
logic of the arguments, or the controlling law and precedent, but rather by 
the level of incessant invective, the system is broken. A summary judgment 
proceeding then becomes an ordeal which is neither dignified nor appropriate 
and, predictably, the result reflects the performance and the process is 
demeaned, as are the participants. 
Somehow, somewhere along the path to summary judgment, the process 
wrongly divorced itself from LC. Section 55-908's constitutional protections and 
morphed into a quasi trial on the merits without the requisite material fact 
finding, or weighing of the true facts. At some point in this process, cooler heads 
must lead the way. This case is, without question, ready for the three R's: 
Reverse, Remand and, regrettably, Reassign. 
~ 
DATED this ___ day of June, 2012. 
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of June 2012, upon the following: 
